A new SEIR type model including quarantine effects and its application
  to analysis of Covid-19 pandemia in Poland in March-April 2020 by Piasecki, Tomasz et al.
A new SEIR type model including quarantine effects and its application to analysis of
Covid-19 pandemia in Poland in March-April 2020
Tomasz Piasecki1, Piotr B. Mucha1, Magdalena Rosin´ska2
1. Institute of Applied Mathematics and Mechanics, University of Warsaw,
ul. Banacha 2, 02-097 Warszawa, Poland.
E-mails: t.piasecki@mimuw.edu.pl, p.mucha@mimuw.edu.pl
2. Department of infectious Disease epidemiology and Surveillance,
National Institute of Public Health - National Institute of Hygiene,
ul. Chocimska 24, Warsaw, Poland.
E-mail: mrosinska@pzh.gov.pl
Abstract
Contact tracing and quarantine are well established non-pharmaceutical epidemic control
tools. The paper aims to clarify the impact of these measures in COVID-19 epidemic. A new
deterministic model is introduced (SEIRQ: susceptible, exposed, infectious, removed, quaran-
tined) with Q compartment capturing individuals and releasing them with delay. We obtain
a simple rule defining the reproduction number R in terms of quarantine parameters, ratio of
diagnosed cases and transmission parameters. The model is applied to the epidemic in Poland
in March - April 2020, when social distancing measures were in place. We investigate 3 scenarios
corresponding to different ratios of diagnosed cases. Our results show that depending on the
scenario contact tracing could have prevented from 50% to over 90% of cases. The effects of
quarantine are limited by fraction of undiagnosed cases. Taking into account the transmission
intensity in Poland prior to introduction of social restrictions it is unlikely that the control of
the epidemic could be achieved without any social distancing measures.
MSC Classification: 92D30, 34D20
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1 Introduction
The epidemic of SARS-CoV-2 infection triggered an unprecedented public health response. Given
the lack of effective vaccine and treatment in 2020, this response included a variety of travel re-
strictions and social distancing measures [2]. While these measures help to slow down the epidemic
they come at significant economical and societal cost [1]. As an alternative an approach focusing on
rapid diagnosis is increasingly recommended [21] and prior to lifting social distancing measures large-
scale community testing should be in place [36]. Testing efforts are complemented by identifying
and quarantining contacts of the diagnosed cases. Of note, by isolating the asymptomatic contacts
from their social networks, this strategy takes into account the pre-symptomatic and asymptomatic
spread of the infection [9, 10], believed to be one of the key drivers of fast spread of COVID-19. As
an example, wide spread testing in general population followed by isolation of the infected helped
to reduce COVID-19 incidence by 90% in an Italian village of Vo’Euganeo [14]. A modelling study
in France offers similar conclusions arguing that relaxing social lock-down will be only feasible in
case of extensive testing [22]. While there is already a number of studies estimating the effects of
general social distancing measures [25, 2, 22, 26], less is known about the impact of quarantine.
Hellewell et al. [27] investigated the potential of rapid isolation of cases and contact tracing to
control the epidemic, finding that prohibitively high levels of timely contact tracing are necessary
to achieve control. However, new technologies may offer sufficiently fast alternative to traditional
contact tracing, in which case the epidemic could be still controlled by contact tracing [28].
Our aim is to develop a SEIR-type model which incorporates the effects of quarantine and
validate it in a setting in which measures to reduce contacts are in place. We apply it to investigate
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the role of quarantine in Poland. The first case of COVID-19 in Poland was diagnosed on March
4th. Social distancing measures were rapidly introduced during the week of 9 - 13th March including
closure of schools and universities, cancellation of mass events and closure of recreation facilities
such as bars, restaurants, gyms etc. as well as shopping malls. Religious gatherings were limited.
Finally, borders were closed for non-citizens [24]. These measures were fully in place on March
16th. Further, beginning at March 25th restrictions on movement and travel were introduced (lock-
down). Wearing face covers became obligatory on April 14th. The restrictions were gradually lifted
beginning at April 20th. We focus on modelling the time period when the social distancing measures
were in place and then consider different scenarios of relaxation of the restrictions with possible
improvement of testing and contact tracing. We note that the procedures for quarantine were in
place even before the social distancing measures. They initially focused on individuals arriving from
COVID-19 affected areas in China. When the epidemic started spreading in European countries
people who came back to Poland from these countries were advised to immediately seek medical
attention if they experienced any symptoms consistent with COVID-19. However, adherence to
these recommendations was not evaluated. As soon as the first case was diagnosed in Poland
quarantine for close contacts was also implemented.
This paper aims to define a deterministic population model describing the epidemic in classical
terms of susceptible, exposed, infectious, removed. In our model the quarantine becomes a separate
state that removes individuals from susceptible and exposed states. We show that the reproductive
number in our model is given by a simple formula referring to the parameters of transmission
and transition, but also to parameters describing the quarantine. We demonstrate that in a real
life scenario (case study of Poland) the quarantine effectively reduces the growth of infectious
compartment. Increasing the efficiency of contact tracing and testing may may to some extent
compensate lifting up the social distancing restrictions.
2 Methods
2.1 The model
We introduce a modification of the classical SEIR model including effects of quarantine. To underline
importance of that extension we call it SEIRQ. Formally the model is described by a system of
ordinary differential equations with delay dedicated to the quarantine.
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Figure 2.1: Schematic representation of the states included in the model. The solid lines
represent the transition parameters and the dashed line indicate that the specific quantity is added.
The following states are included in the model:
S(t) – susceptible
E(t) – exposed (infected, not infectious)
Id(t) – infectious who will be diagnosed
Iu(t) – infectious who will not be diagnosed
Rd(t) – diagnosed and isolated
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Ru(t) – spontaneously recovered without being diagnosed
Q(t) – quarantined
The figure 2.1 presents the schematic representation of the model. A susceptible individual
(state S), when becoming infected first moves to the state E, to model the initial period, when the
infected individual is not yet infectious. Next the cases progress to one of the infectious states Id, Iu
at the rates κσ and (1 − κ)σ, respectively. In general, moving through the Id pathway concerns
these individuals who (independently of quarantine) would meet the testing criteria, as relevant to
the local testing policy, e.g. testing of people with noticeable symptoms. We shall emphasize that
from the point of view of analysis of spread of infection, the quantity Iu shall be regarded rather as
not recognized infections, not necessarily asymptomatic or mild. With this interpretation the value
of κ can be influenced by intensity of testing.
The creation of state E is via Id and Iu with transmission rates βd and βu, respectively, nor-
malized to the total population size N = S + E + Id + Iu + Rd + Ru + Q, which is assumed to be
constant in time, births and deaths are neglected.
The transition parameter σ is assumed identical for both groups, relating to the time between
infection and becoming infectious. The infectious individuals then move to the state Rd, which
is the state of being diagnosed and isolated (and later recovered or deceased), with the rate γd
corresponding to the observed time between onset and diagnosis. On the other hand Ru contains
people who spontaneously recovered with rate γu. Our model includes an additional state of being
quarantined (Q). To mimic the situation of contact tracing, individuals can be put in quarantine
from the state S (uninfected contacts) or the state E (infected contacts). These individuals stay
in the quarantine for a predefined time period T . We assume that the number of people who
will be quarantined depend on the number of individuals who are diagnosed. An average number
of individuals quarantined per each diagnosed person is denoted as α. However, as the epidemic
progresses some of the contacts could be identified among people who were already infected, but
were not previously diagnosed, i.e. the state Ru. We note that moving individuals between the
states Q and Ru has no effect on the epidemic dynamics, therefore we assume that only individuals
from S and E are quarantined and we reduce the average number of people put on quarantine by
the factor S(t)S(t)+Ru(t) . Further, to acknowledge the capacity limits of the public health system to
perform the contact tracing, we introduce a quantity Kmax, describing the maximum number of
people who can be put in quarantine during one time step.
We also assume that among the quarantined a proportion θ is infected. After the quarantine,
the infected part θK(t− T ) goes to Rd and the rest (1− θ)K(t− T ) returns to S.
Taking all of the above into account, the model is described with the following SEIRQ system:
S˙(t) = −S(t)(βdId(t) + βuIu(t))− (1− θ)K(t) + (1− θ)K(t− T ),
E˙(t) = S(t)(βdId(t) + βuIu(t))− σE(t)− θK(t)
I˙d(t) = κσE(t)− γdId(t),
I˙u(t) = (1− κ)σE(t)− γuIu(t),
R˙d(t) = γdId(t) + θK(t− T ),
R˙u(t) = γuIu(t),
Q˙(t) = K(t)−K(t− T ),
where K(t) = min{ S(t)S(t)+Ru(t)αγdId(t),Kmax}, and α, βd, βu, γd, γu, θ, T ≥ 0.
(2.1)
We assume that the parameters α, βd, βu, θ, γu and γd depend on the country and time-specific
public health interventions and may therefore change in time periods. Due to proper interpretation
of the equation on E we require that βd ≥ θαγd to ensure positiveness of E.
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2.2 Basic reproductive number, critical transmission parameter β∗.
Based on the general theory of SEIR type models [23], we introduce the reproductive number
R = κ
(
βd
γd
− θα
)
+ (1− κ)βu
γu
. (2.2)
It determines the stability of the system as R < 1 and instability for R > 1 (the growth/decrease of
pandemia). This quantity not only explains the importance is testing (in terms of κ) and quarantine
(in terms of α), but also gives an indication on levels of optimal testing and contact tracing. We
underline that this formula works for the case when the capacity of the contact tracing has not been
exceeded (K(t) < Kmax). The details of derivation of (2.2) are provided in the Appendix, section
A.4. We shall emphasize the formal mathematical derivation holds for the case when I and E are
small comparing to S. Therefore the complete dynamics of the nonlinear system (2.1) is not fully
determined by (2.2). However in the regime of epidemic suppression, which is the case of COVID-19
epidemic in Poland, I and E are small compared to S and so the formula (2.2) reasonably prescribes
spreading of infection in the population.
The critical value R = 1 defines the level of transmission which is admissible, taking into account
the existing quarantine policy, in order to control epidemic. As the level of transmission depends on
the level of contacts, this provides information on the necessary level of social distancing measures.
The formula (2.2) indicates that improving the contact tracing may compensate relaxation of contact
restrictions. The key quantity is θα. Indeed the system with the quarantine has the same stability
properties as one without K, but with the new transmission rate βnewd = βd − θαγd. In order to
guarantee the positiveness of E, βnewd must be nonnegative. It generates the constraint
θαγd ≤ βd. (2.3)
The above condition also implies the theoretical maximal admissible level of quarantine. We define
it by improving the targeting of the quarantine, i.e. by the highest possible level of θ:
θmax =
βd
γdα
. (2.4)
As long as the Kmax threshold is not exceeded the effect of the increase in θ or in α play the same
role at the level of linearization (small I, E). However, in general it is not the case and for the
purpose of our analysis we fix α.
For our analysis we assume βd = βu = β. The reason is that, both Id and Iu contain a mixture of
asymptomatic and symptomatic cases and although there might be a difference we lack information
to quantify this difference. Then using formula (2.2) we compute critical values β∗(κ, θ, α) defined
as
R(β∗) = 1, namely β∗(κ, θ, α, γd, γu) = (1 + θακ)γdγu
γuκ+ γd(1− κ) . (2.5)
It shows the upper bound on transmission rate β which still guarantees the suppression of pandemic.
We shall omit the dependence on γd, γu as these are fixed in our case, and denote briefly β
∗(κ, θ, α).
In the case of maximal admissible quarantine (2.4) we obtain
β∗(θmax, κ) =
γu
1− κ, (2.6)
which can be regarded as theoretical upper bound for β if we assume ”optimal admissible” quaran-
tine for fixed κ, for which the epidemic could be still controlled. It must be kept in mind though
that the condition (2.3) means that we are able to efficiently isolate all persons infected by every
diagnosed, therefore is unrealistic. The resulting β∗(θmax, κ) should be therefore considered as a
theoretical limit for transmission rate.
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2.3 Fitting procedure
All simulations are performed using GNU Octave (https://www.gnu.org/software/octave/). The
underlying tool for all computations is a direct finite difference solver with a 1 day time step.
Basic assumptions for data fitting. We estimate the transmission rates β by fitting the
model predictions to the data on the cumulative number of confirmed cases. Since people with
confirmed diagnosis are efficiently isolated, they are immediately included into Rd. Therefore, the
quantity fitted to the data is Rd(t).
The crucial assumption behind our approach is that the parameter β changes twice during
the period of analysis. The reason is that we can distinguish two important time points in the
development of epidemic in Poland. The first is initial restrictions including school closure effective
March 12, which was accompanied with restrictions on other social activities. As we do not take
migration into account in our model, we assume that the effect of border closing is reflected in β.
The second turning point was a lockdown announced on March 25.
For simplicity we comprise the effect of above measures in two jump changes in β in t ∈ {t1, t2}
and choose t1 = 14, t2 = 28. With t = 1 corresponding to March 3 it means small delay with
respect to the above dates which can be justified by the fact that new cases are reported with a
delay of approximately 2 days.
Choice of fixed parameters (Tab. 2.1). We assume that the parameters σ, γu represent the
natural course of infection and their values could be based on the existing literature. The parameter
σ describes the rate of transition from non-infectious incubation state E into the infectious states
Id or Iu. The value of σ takes into account the incubation period and presymptomatic infectivity
period. γu relates to the period of infectivity, which we select based on the research regarding milder
cases, assuming that serious cases are likely diagnosed. Further, κ is a parameter related both to the
proportion of asymptomatic infection and the local testing strategies. Since the literature findings
provide different possible figures, for κ we examine three different scenarios.
Parameters γd, θ and α are fixed in our model for the purpose of data fitting, but informed
by available data. One of the scenarios of future dynamics of the epidemic (section 3.3) considers
possible increase of θ. Parameter γd was estimated basing on time from onset to diagnosis for
diagnosed cases, and θ as rate of diagnosed among quarantined. Furthermore we fix the parameter
α by comparing the number of quarantined people obtained in simulations with actual data. The
capacity level of public health services is set in terms of possible number of quarantined per day
Kmax, as double the level observed so far. Detailed justification of the values of fixed parameters
collected in the following table, is given in the Appendix, section A.2.
Parameter Value Source
σ 13.5 Literature: incubation time [3, 4, 5]
+ presymptomatic spread [7, 9, 10]
γd
1
5.5 Observed data: appendix section A.2
γu
1
10 Literature: [11], WHO mission report from China
κ {0.2; 0.5; 0.8} Literature: proportion asymptomatic
or undocumented [6, 13, 14, 15]
θ 0.006 Observed data: appendix section A.2
α 75 Observed data: appendix section A.2
Kmax 50 000 2× the maximum level observed so far (arbitrary decision)
Table 2.1: Fixed parameters used in the model
Optimization algorithm. In order to fit the values β1, β2, β3 we use a standard gradient
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descent algorithm. The error function is defined as mean square difference between the cumulative
number of diagnoses and the Rd(t) predicted from the model.
For the initial values the error function is optimized only for a limited number of possible
conditions, as these mostly impact β1, which is less relevant for future predictions. To estimate
confidence intervals we use a method of parametric bootstrap. The optimisation procedures are
described in the Appendix, section A.1, where we also show precise errors of data fitting.
Dataset. The data series contains cumulative number of confirmed cases of COVID-19 in Poland
from March 3 (first confirmed case in Poland) till April 26, which amounts to 54 observations. The
data are taken from official communications of the Ministry of Health. As explained in table 2.1
and appendix (section A.2 additional data sources were used for choosing θ, α and γd.
3 Results
3.1 Estimation of parameters and ”no-change” scenario predictions
In Table 3.1 we show estimated values of βi, where i = 1, 2, 3 correspond to the time intervals when
different measures were in place, and the R for the third time interval. Given the social distancing
measures in place early April 2020, as well as the quarantine levels, the reproductive number was
below 1, independently of the value of κ, which relates to testing effectiveness. The figure 3.1 shows
the fit of the models assuming different levels of κ. Good fit is found for all three models although
predictions start to differ in the middle-term prognosis.
κ = 0.2 κ = 0.5 κ = 0.8
β1 0.635 0.684 0.738
(0.569 , 0.701) (0.611 , 0.744) (0.672 , 0.812)
β2 0.332 0.383 0.442
(0.288 , 0.397) (0.336 , 0.443) (0.4 , 0.514)
β3 0.099 0.132 0.175
(0.081 , 0.118) (0.11 , 0.149) (0.147 , 0.214)
R(β3, 0.006, 75) 0.817 0.802 0.772
(0.651 , 0.977) (0.648 , 0.915) (0.569 , 0.874)
Table 3.1: Estimated values of βi and values of R corresponding to the latest estimation period
with 95% confidence intervals
We proceed with predictions assuming that the restrictions are continued, i.e.keeping β = β3
(note that the estimated β3 is different for each κ). We calculate the epidemic duration (tmax), the
peak number of infected (Imaxd , I
max
u ) and the final size of the epidemic (Rd(tmax), Ru(tmax)). In
order to show the influence of quarantine we compare the situation with quarantine, keeping the
same θ, α, to the situation without quarantine, setting αθ = 0. The results of the development of
the epidemic during the first 120 days are shown on Figure 3.2.
For κ = 0.2 the difference between the scenarios with and without quarantine is visible but not
striking. However for κ = 0.5 and κ = 0.8 a bifurcation in the number of new cases occurs around
t = 40 leading to huge difference in the total time of epidemic and total number of cases. These
values are summarized in the table 3.2. We note that given the epidemic state in the first half
of April 2020 for all values of κ the model predicts epidemic extinction both with quarantine and
without quarantine. However, since the epidemic is very near to the endemic state, the predicted
duration is very long, especially if no quarantine is applied.
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Figure 3.1: Results of model fit to cumulative diagnosed cases (Rd) for κ = 0.2, 0.5, 0.8 (panel A)
and corresponding predictions for undiagnosed, recovered compartment, Ru (panel B). Coloured
shades correspond to 95% confidence intervals for the respective colour line.
κ quarantine factors Rd(tmax) Ru(tmax) I
max
d I
max
u tmax
0.2 θ = 0.006, α = 75 31 85 1.9 10.8 450
θ, α = 0 44 175 2.1 12.5 830
0.5 θ = 0.006, α = 75 29 20 1.9 2.7 330
θ, α = 0 1078 1078 5.1 9.2 3200
0.8 θ = 0.006, α = 75 24 4 1.9 0.7 230
θ, α = 0 6317 1579 10.6 47.6 1280
Table 3.2: Duration of epidemic (tmax) in days, the final values of Rd and Ru, in thousands
(Rd(tmax), Ru(tmax)) and peak values of Id and Iu, in thousands (I
max
d , I
max
u ) according to quaran-
tine and testing scenarios.
7
 Figure 3.2: Predicted values of Rd, Ru (panels A – C) and Id, Iu (panels D – E), as depending on
the value of κ and whether or not the quarantine is implemented. For t > 54 β = β3 estimated for
each κ, with the same quarantine parameters or without quarantine at all.
3.2 Critical β∗ for the current situation
Using the formula (2.5) we can compute critical values β∗. In Table 3.3 we show the values of
β∗(κ, 0.006, 75) and for convenience recall also estimated values of β3 and R, listed already in
Table 3.1. Moreover we compute β∗(κ, 0, 0), i.e. without quarantine and show values of R for our
estimated values of β3 and the same γd, γu but without quarantine. Comparing the estimated values
of β3 (table 3.3) for all cases of κ are only slightly below β
∗.
κ β3 β
∗(κ, 0.006, 75) R(β3, κ, 0.006, 75) β∗(κ, 0, 0) R(β3, κ, 0, 0) β3 − θαγd
0.2 0.099 0.12 0.817 0.11 0.907 0.018
0.5 0.132 0.158 0.802 0.129 1.03 0.051
0.8 0.175 0.211 0.772 0.155 1.132 0.074
Table 3.3: Values of β∗ and R(β3) with quarantine (i = 0.006, α = 75) and without quarantine
Eliminating the quarantine, for the estimated values of β3, we have different situations depending
on the actual value of κ. In case κ = 0.2, so assuming that currently only 20% of infections are
diagnosed, the low values of R are due to low β3 rather than the effect of quarantine (controlling
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epidemic by social contact restrictions). In effect even if we remove the quarantine we have still
R < 1, but very close to 1. On the other hand if κ = 0.5 or κ = 0.8 we estimate higher β3,
which corresponds to the situation of controlling the epidemic by extensive testing and quarantine.
For these cases, if we remove the quarantine, we end up with R > 1. The quantity β3 − θαγd
represents effective transmission rate due to diagnosed cases. In particular it shows by how much
the transmission could be reduced by improved contact tracing (θα) and faster diagnosis (γd).
These results confirm that the higher is the ratio of undiagnosed infections, the weaker is influ-
ence of quarantine. In the next section we verify these results numerically.
3.3 Impact of quarantine at relaxation of social distancing
Our second goal is to simulate loosening of restrictions. In particular we want to verify numerically
the critical thresholds β∗ listed in table 3.3. For this purpose we assume that at t = 60 we change
β. For each value of κ we consider 3 scenarios:
(a) Current level quarantine: i.e. quarantine parameters θ = 0.006, α = 75 are maintained;
(b) No quarantine is applied starting from t = 60;
(c) The maximal admissible quarantine is applied, meaning that θmax =
β
αγd
(see (2.2)). In this
case α = 75. As long as the limit Kmax is not reached there is no difference whether we increase
α or θ, the decisive parameter is αθ. Increasing α would lead to reaching K = Kmax earlier and
hence worse outcomes.
Figures 3.3-3.5 show the final values of R = Rd + Ru and time till the end of epidemic depending
on the value of β for t ≥ 60. for above 3 scenarios and different values of κ. The theoretical values
of β∗ are shown by black lines.
The results confirm that around β∗ a rapid increase in the total number of infected occurs,
coinciding with the peak total epidemic duration. Thus the numerical computations confirm that
the critical β∗ calculated for the linear approximation in the section 2.2 are adequate, with a small
bias towards lower values.
 
 
Figure 3.3: Duration of epidemic and the final epidemic size as dependent on β, for κ = 0.2.
The case κ = 0.2 shows that the influence of quarantine is not high, even for the maximal
admissible case, when we are able to efficiently isolate all persons infected by every diagnosed.
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Figure 3.4: Duration of epidemic and the final epidemic size as dependent on β, for κ = 0.5.
 
 
Figure 3.5: Duration of epidemic and the final epidemic size as dependent on β, for κ = 0.8.
A striking feature in the behaviour of total number of infected are jumps for certain critical
value of β observed for κ = 0.5 and κ = 0.8, both in case θ = 0.006 and θ = θmax. The values of
Rd and Ru before and after these qualitative changes are summarized in Table 3.4.
A closer investigation for these values of β shows that in all 4 cases the jump occurs for the
first value of β for which the limit number of quarantined, Kmax = 50000, is achieved. Notice that
immediately after passing the threshold the values become very close to those without quarantine.
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β Rd(tmax) Ru(tmax) tmax
κ = 0.5, θ = 0.006, 0.163 1171 811 4170
0.164 6160 5875 1200
κ = 0.5, θ = θmax(β), 0.211 1423 666 4800
0.212 11458 10971 840
κ = 0.8, θ = 0.006 0.218 1137 236 4740
0.219 13706 3365 1060
κ = 0.8, θ = θmax(β) 0.566 1762 108 2850
0.567 27602 6729 570
Table 3.4: Critical values of β obtained in simulations and corresponding final numbers of diag-
nosed/undiagnosed (in thousands) and total time of epidemic.
Therefore the effect of quarantine is immediately and almost completely cancelled after passing the
critical value of β. The transition is milder in the case κ = 0.2 which can be explained by the fact
that the transition takes place for lower values of β.
Results of our simulations confirm the theoretical prediction that the margin in relaxation of
restrictions is very narrow if we want to avoid a blow up of the number infections. Strengthening
of quarantine allows to remain in a stable regime while increasing β.
4 Discussion
We propose a simple SEIR-type model (SEIRQ), which includes the effects of testing and contact
tracing. The model formulation allows to calculate an interpretable formula for the reproductive
number R (2.2). As typical for this class of models, R depends on transmission parameters β.
Increasing β corresponding in e.g. to higher frequency of social contacts increases R. Decreasing
β, for example in consequence of widespread use of face masks, has the opposite effect. On the
other hand γd reflects the time to diagnosis and the formula indicates that more rapid diagnosis
is associated with lower R. In addition, our model offers a clear interpretation of the quarantine
effect. The transmission rate due to diagnosed cases, βd, is decreased by the factor θαγd indicating
that both the number of quarantined per diagnosed individual (α) and proper targeting of the
quarantine (the infection rate among the quarantined θ) equally contribute to this factor. Also the
parameter related to testing: the delay in diagnosis, γ−1d , plays similar role. This quantifies the
potential of a wide range of interventions to improve testing and contact tracing, as outlined in e.g.
in ECDC recommendations [31]. In particular, as the number of people put in quarantine per each
case and the infection rate among the quarantined impact R in similar fashion, our results support
the recommendations to focus on the high risk contacts when the resources do not allow to follow
all contacts.
Our model takes into consideration only the effective contact tracing, i.e. the situation when the
infected contacts are identified and put in quarantine before they become infectious. People who
are identified later would be modelled as passing through one of the I states to the R states. This
means that the number of quarantined in our model can be also increased by faster contact tracing.
The timely identification of contacts may be a significant challenge in the quarantine approach
given that the incubation time can be as short as 2 days in 25% of cases [3]. As mentioned by
other Authors [28], the delays in manual contact tracing are usually at least 3 days and under such
circumstances the contact tracing and quarantine alone may be insufficient to control the epidemic.
This could be improved with digital contact tracing. Notably, mixed contact tracing strategies
implemented in South Korea indeed helped to control the epidemic at the early stages [32]. The
use of ”smart contact tracing” with mobile phone location data and administrative databases were
also key to rapid identification and self-quarantine of contacts in Taiwan [33] and implementation of
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such strategy helped Singapore to control the epidemic without major disruptions of social activities
[34].
We note that the quarantine effect relates only to transmission due to diagnosed cases. As
expected, in order to control the epidemic the transmission due to undiagnosed cases has to be
negligible. This can be controlled by general measures such as lockdown, which universally decrease
the frequency of social contacts and are therefore likely to reduce βu. In our model the part of R
representing transmission due to undiagnosed cases is scaled by (1− κ), the parameter relating to
the efficiency of the testing system. Again, the examples of Singapore as well as the Italian village
of Vo’Euganeo show that the widespread testing complementing the efficient contact tracing was
essential to suppress epidemic. Testing unrelated to epidemiological links decreases (1− κ) factor,
thus making the factors impacting transmission due to diagnosed cases, such as quarantine, more
powerful to decrease R.
Further, our model allows to study the effect of the situation, in which the contact tracing
capacities are exceeded. In this situation the epidemic is likely to quickly develop to the levels
observed without quarantine. It is therefore quite crucial to implement the aggressive contact
tracing system, when the epidemic is still at low levels and it is possible to bring the epidemic to
suppression phase.
We demonstrate the high impact of contact tracing and quarantine on the observed numbers of
cases in Poland. This effect was coupled with substantial reduction in the transmission parameter
β resulting from social contact restrictions. Depending on the scenario, β decreased by 76% to 84%,
bringing R below 1. The estimated effect of the quarantine in Poland would depend on which of
the considered scenarios regarding testing efficiency was the most relevant to our situation. In our
model the quarantine is estimated to be the most effective for the scenario in which most of the cases
are diagnosed (κ = 0.8). Testing strategies that comprise testing of all individuals with symptoms of
respiratory illness could theoretically identify up to 82% of infected, assuming they would all present
to medical care. This could be coupled with random screening of high risk individuals, in e.g. health
care workers, or - in case of high incidence - even random screening of entire community to achieve
the κ of the order of 0.8. The Polish clinical recommendations specifically mention only testing
all individuals with severe infections [35]. In addition testing is provided to health care workers.
The severe course corresponds to approximately 18% of all infections [3]. Therefore, the κ = 0.8
scenario is unlikely to be realistic in Poland. We believe that the plausible current κ in our country
lies between 0.2 and 0.5. For these scenarios the model shows that the control of the epidemic is
largely achieved through suppression of β. In case of relaxation of social contact restrictions, the
efforts should be focused on increasing the level of testing in order to decrease the proportion of
undiagnosed cases as well as maintaining or increasing the effectiveness of quarantine. For smaller
κ, even substantially increasing the effectiveness of quarantine does not allow to go back to the level
of social contacts from before the epidemic (β1).
Finally, the contact tracing effort was manageable in Poland due to relatively small number of
cases. Should the case load increase substantially longer delays in contact tracing would occur,
which can substantially decrease the effects of quarantine [27, 28].
Limitations and future directions of research. We do not consider the likely reduced
transmission from undiagnosed cases who are more likely to be asymptomatic or paucisymtopmatic
cases (βu < βd). The reduction factor for infectiousness of asymptomatic is still under investigation.
One study found a 60-fold lower viral loads in asymptomatic cases [29], but another estimated the
transmissibility reduction by 50% [6]. Moreover, we did not have sufficient data to include this
additional parameter. We calibrated our model only to diagnosed cases, which were officially avail-
able. Calibration to mortality data is another approach successfully implemented in e.g. [25] that
potentially removes bias due to different testing policies. As there were relatively fewer fatalities in
Poland and little data on clinical progression we decided on simplified model without explicit mod-
elling of the outcomes. Furthermore, we did not consider the sub-optimal adherence to quarantine.
It is likely that some individuals would not fully comply to strict quarantine rules. However, only
anecdotal evidence for such phenomenon is available at this time. In our model it would decrease
the effective αθ, which was chosen to fit to observed number of people put in quarantine. Finally,
the analysis of R is suitable for small size of epidemic, when S ≈ N . For other cases the results are
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still useful, but the approximation may be biased, as we have shown for β∗. Due to little available
data and policy changes we did not have sufficient data to determine which κ scenario is the most
appropriate.
In conclusion we present a simple model, which allows to understand the effects of testing,
contact tracing and quarantining of the contacts. We apply the model to the data in Poland and
we show that despite a substantial impact of contact tracing and quarantine, it is unlikely that the
control of the epidemic could be achieved without any reduction of social contacts.
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A Appendix
A.1 Optimization algorithm.
In order to fit the values β1, β2, β3 we use a standard gradient descent algorithm. Namely, we define
error function as
E(κ) =
[∑54
t=1[Rd(κ, t)− data(t)]2∑54
t=1 |data(t)|2
]1/2
, (A.1)
where {Rd(κ, t)}54t=1 is the vector of computed values of Rd and {data(t)}54t=1 the vector of data
(cumulative number of confirmed cases).
At each step we approximate the gradient of the error function with respect to β1, β2, β3 by
differential quotients and move in the direction opposite to the gradient. The algorithm reveals
a good performance provided we start sufficiently close to the minimum, which is not difficult to
ensure in our case.
It remains to choose the initial data. A closer look on results of simulations shows that the
choice of initial data mostly influence the fitting in the beginning of period under consideration
and hence the value of β1, while for analysis of future scenarios β3 is the most important. Taking
all this into account we do not struggle for sharp optimization of data fitting with respect to
initial data and restrict to the following heuristic choice. It is natural to assume Iu(0) =
1−κ
κ Id(0).
Concerning the choice of E(0) we assume it in a form E(0) = m(Id(0) + Iu(0)). We set initial
values Id(0) ∈ {10, 20, 30} and for each value we set Iu(0) according to the above formula and
three values of E(0) corresponding to m ∈ {2, 3, 4}. For each of these 9 combinations we run the
optimization algorithm looking for the best fit of βi, i = 1 . . . 3. We have repeated this approach for
κ ∈ {0.2, 0.5, 0.8}. It turns in that for all values of κ the best fit was obtained for Id(0) = 20 and
m = 2. More careful analysis around Id(0) = 20 did not improve the quality of fitting, therefore:
Id(0) = 20, Iu(0) =
1− κ
κ
Id(0), E(0) = 2(Id(0) + Iu(0))
is our final choice. We obtain the following fitting error defined by (A.1):
κ 0.2 0.5 0.8
E(κ) 0.0077 0.0079 0.0084
Table A.1: Errors of data fit.
A.2 Choice of fixed parameters
1. The parameter σ describes the rate of transition from non-infectious incubation state E into the
infectious states Id or Iu. The median incubation time from exposure till the onset of symptoms was
estimated at 4 to 5 days [3, 4, 5]. However, there exists evidence that typically infectivity preceeds
symptoms, by 1 to 3 days [7, 9, 10].
A modelling study identified the rate of transition between the non-infectious and infectious
states at 13.69 [6], which corresponds to an average time lag of 3.69 days untill the case becomes
infectious.
2. The parameter γu represents the period of infectivity during the natural course of disease.
We discuss the period of infectivity, especially as applied to mild cases. The median duration of
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viral shedding was estimated among 113 Chinese hospitalized patients. Overall it was 17 days, but
it was shorter among cases with milder clinical course [16]. A study among 23 patients in Hong
Kong confirmed viral shedding longer than 20 days among a third of patients, although the peak
level of shedding was noted during the first week of infection [17]. In the mission report from China
WHO reports viral shedding in mild and moderate cases to last 7 - 12 days from symptom onset.
Among younger and asymptomatic or mild cases the shedding may be shorter: in a study among
24 initially asymptomatic youngsters the median duration was 9.5 days [11].
3. The value of κ generally depends on the testing policy. However, recommended testing
policies often rely on the presence of respiratory symptoms. This is also the case in Poland. It
was observed that some infected people never develop symptoms, although the precised rate of such
truly asymptomatic infections is still under investigation. Some studies may be biased by a too short
follow-up time. A small study among residents of a long-term care skilled nursing facility found that
even though more than half of individuals with confirmed infection were asymptomatic at the time
of test, majority of them subsequently developed symptoms. The proportion of people who remain
asymptomatic may be higher among younger individuals [Hu]. A study among Japanese nationals
repatriated from Wuhan suggests the proportion of asymptomatic infections is about 30% [13]. An
analysis among the passengers of Diamond Princess ship, where a COVID-19 outbreak occurred,
taking into account this delayed onset of symptoms estimated the proportion of asymptomatic
infections to be about 18%, even though almost 50% were asymptomatic on initial test. In addition,
large scale screening implemented in Italian village Vo’Euganeo indicated that 50% to 75% of
infected individuals did not report symptoms [14]. Similarly, in population screening in Iceland
50% were asymptomatic at the time of screening [15]. It may be stipulated that some of the people
diagnosed through screening developed symptoms latter, consistently with the findings from the
Diamond Princess study.
On the other hand a sizable proportion of infected people, especially at younger ages, experience
only mild symptoms, for which they may not seek medical attention. In the study of Li [6], the
proportion of undocumented cases was estimated as 86%.
4. The parameter γd was estimated basing on a sample of case-based data available in routine
surveillance, by fitting gamma distribution to the time from onset to diagnosis, for cases who
were not in quarantine before diagnosis. Time from onset to diagnosis was estimated based on
surveillance data available in the Epidemiological Reports Registration System for COVID-19, as of
28.04.2020.The system collects epidemiological data on cases diagnosed in Poland and is operated
by local public health departments. All cases eventually are entered into the database. However,
substantial reporting delays are noted. There were altogether 4976 cases registered in the system,
including 1995 (40.1%), who did not have symptoms at the time of diagnosis. Plausible onset
date and plausible diagnosis date were available for 2884 cases ( 96.7% of 2981 cases that were not
asymptomatic)
Gamma distribution was fitted by maximum likelihood to cases who were not diagnosed in
quarantine. The observed and fitted distributions are shown below (figure A.1).
We next fitted gamma-regression model with week of diagnosis as an explanatory variable. We
found no significant trend in time. We therefore adopted the average time from onset to diagnosis
to be 4.6 days, and taking into account the probability of asymptomatic spread we assumed the
parameter γd to be 1/5.5.
5. Next we base θ on available data. We calculate prevalence of infection among the quarantined
individuals, according to data published by the Chief Sanitary Inspectorate on the number of cases
diagnosed among quarantined people and the total number of quarantined. We used a series of
data 8.04 – 20.04 to estimate a likely value of θ. We chose this time period due to data availability.
Data are shown on the figure below. During this time period there was an increasing trend in the
proportion of diagnosed from 0.5% to 0.8% A.2. We presume that this parameter could change with
changing procedures of contact tracing and testing. However, since no detailed data were available,
for the modelling purposes we chose a simplifying assumption that θ is stable (i.e. we always take
a similar group of contacts under quarantine) selecting an average value of 0.6%.
This proportion could be also viewed as attack rate among the contacts of cases. The proportion
in Poland is in line with what was observed in Korea, where an estimated attack rate was 0.55%
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19 in this population
overall and 7.56% among household contacts [32], although household attack rate was higher (>
19%) in other studies [20].
6. Furthermore we fix the parameter α. Here we make another simplification assuming this
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parameter to be constant. The main difficulty is a lack of precise data concerning the number of
newly quarantined people per day, distinguishing between reasons of quarantine (travel related or
contact tracing relate). At the beginning of epidemic in Poland the average amount of quarantined
following one diagnosed case was definitely higher. Moreover, people coming back from abroad
were subject to obligatory quarantine starting from March 16 and constituted a considerable part
of quarantined in the second half of March and beginning of April. In particular, around 54 000
Polish citizens staying abroad came back within a special program of charter flights operated by
Polish Airlines which ended on April 5. We can assume that after this date the ratio of people
coming from abroad among all people subject to quarantine was negligible. As our model does not
take migration into account, we have to take into account only quarantine from contact. For above
reasons, for fitting α we restrict our analysis only to a period of 2 weeks of April. Assuming already
θ = 0.006 we then choose α minimizing the square error between the number of quarantined from
the data and computed K(t). This way we obtain α = 75.
Taking these into consideration we set the values of parameters collected in table 2.1.
A.3 Confidence intervals
Bootstrap. To estimate confidence intervals we use a method of parametric bootstrap. We generate
M = 200 sequences of perturbed data assuming that for each time t ∈ {1, 54} the increment of R
(i.e. daily number of new diagnoses) is a random number from Poisson distribution with mean value
equal to increment of observed data.
Model parameters are also perturbed, see below. For each series of perturbed data we estimate
the values of βi and take estimated confidence intervals as appropriate quantiles of obtained sets.
In order to estimate confidence intervals for Rd(t), shown on panel A of figure 3.1, we proceed
as follows. For each sequence of perturbed data we compute fitted Rd(t). This way we obtain a set
of curves
{R(k)d (t)}t=1,...,54k=1,...,200.
Then for each time instant t ∈ {1, 54} we set lower and upper bounds of the confidence interval
of Rd(t) as appropriate quantiles of the set {R(k)d (t)}200k=1. Analogously we compute the confidence
intervals for Ru(t) shown on panel B of figure 3.1.
Distribution of parameters. Following other Authors [30] as well as experimental data, for
the uncertainty analysis we used the following distributions of the parameters.
1. 1/γd ∼ Gamma(a1, b1), where the shape parameter, a1 = 1.05 and scale parameter b1 = 5.23
2. 1/γu ∼ Gamma(a2, b2), where the shape parameter, a2 = 2 and scale parameter b2 = 5
3. 1/σ ∼ Gamma(a3, b3), where the shape parameter, a2 = 2 and scale parameter b2 = 1.75
4. α ∼ Poisson(α0), where we assume constant α0 = 75;
5. θ - is not sampled for the uncertainty analysis. As the results depend on the quantity αθ, we
rely on the distribution of α.
We take N = 200 (approximate average of daily number of diagnosed cases from the data). We
approximate the mean value of N samples from Gamma distribution using Central Limit Theorem.
Namely, we generate
1
γd
∼ N (a1b1, a1b
2
1
N
),
1
γu
∼ N (a2b2, a2b
2
2
N
),
1
σ
∼ N (a3b3, a3b
2
3
N
).
A.4 Stability analysis - computation of R
Based on the classical approach to epidemiological models we address the basic question concerning
the propagation of the disease. Namely, how many persons are infected by one infectious individual,
a quantity which is usually called reproductive number, R. In order to compute this quantity we
use the approach from [23]. We look at the system assuming S ∼ N and E, Id, Iu are close to zero,
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then we consider the following linearization
E˙(t) = βdId(t) + βuIu(t)− σE(t)− θαγdId(t),
I˙d(t) = κσE(t)− γdId(t),
I˙u(t) = (1− κ)σE(t)− γuIu(t).
(A.2)
Note that in the above subsystem there are no delay effects. We write (A.2) as
x˙ = (T − Σ)x (A.3)
where x = (E, Id, Iu)
T , T is the transmission matrix and Σ – the transition matrix. T has nonneg-
ative entries and Σ is lower triangular with strictly positive eigenvalues:
T =
 0 βd − θαγd βu0 0 0
0 0 0
 , Σ =
 σ 0 0−κσ γd 0
−(1− κ)σ 0 γu.
 (A.4)
The system (A.3) can be rewritten as
x˙ = −(Id− TΣ−1)Σx. (A.5)
Then one deduces (see [23]) that if we define R = max{eigenvalues of TΣ−1} then
the system is stable for R < 1 and it is unstable for R > 1.
Stability of system (A.5) means that the whole vector (E, Id, Iu) is going to zero, it follows that the
main system (2.1) also tends to the zero solution for (E, Id, Iu). Instability implies that for ”almost
all” small data, the vector (E, Id, Iu) is growing in time (exponentially fast), causing the nonlinear
system also evolves far away from the trivial state, i.e. E, Id, Iu rapidly grow.
By (A.4) we have
TΣ−1 =
 κ(βd−θαγd)γd + (1−κ)βuγu βd−θαγdγd βuγu0 0 0
0 0 0
 .
Hence the stability of our system is determined by the following factor:
R = κβd
γd
+
(1− κ)βu
γu
− κθα. (A.6)
To make a final comment, let us note that in case of spread of pandemia, as Rd, Ru grow, the
above analysis become less reliable. Recall that β is normalized by N , so as S/N is not close to one
and the analysis of stability becomes more complex. This behavior is illustrated by figures 3.3, 3.4
and 3.5, where we observe deviation from predictions based on (2.2),
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